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THE MODERNIZATION OF COMMERCIAL SECURITY
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
HoMER KRiPKE*
Article 9 of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code had as its background sub-
stantial bodies of earlier statutory material on security in chattels and receivables,
such as the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,2 the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act,3
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,4 Factors' Lien Acts,5 and conditional sale and
chattel mortgage legislation in nearly every state, and "accounts receivable legislation"
in the majority of states.0 Article 9 is among the most novel of the articles of the
Code in the extent to which it represents a complete recasting of the prior statutory
material dealing with the same subject matter, with new concepts replacing the old.
Article 9 covers the whole field of security in tangible chattels, thereby replacing
the earlier statutory material on such subjects. It also deals with the whole subject
of the transfer of "receivables" (choses in action), whether by way of security or by
way of transfer of absolute ownership therein, thereby replacing all of the state legis-
lation on that subject adopted in the last ten years.
It will be seen that the article links up very closely with the Articles on Sales and
on Commercial Paper (negotiable instruments). A sale of goods, unless it is strictly
a cash sale, gives rise to a receivable of some sort. Even if the receivable is an ordi-
nary 30 or 6o day open account, it may itself become a subject of a separate financing
transaction. Such financing occurs in large volume when the merchant does not
have the working capital with which to cover the lag between the time when he is
required to pay for his merchandise and the time when he has sold it and his cus-
tomer is required to pay for it. Thus arise the fields of "factoring" (which is
basically the purchase by a financial institution of open accounts without recourse,
*A.B. 1931, J.D. 1933, University of Michigan. Presently Assistant to the General Counsel, C. I. T.
Financial Corporation, New York. Formerly Assistant Solicitor, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. Author, Chattel Paper As a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
59 YALE L. J. 1269 (1950); The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
35 VA. L. RIv. 577 (949), and various other articles in legal periodicals.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein are to a Reporters' mimeographed draft of Article
9 prepared for working purposes subsequent to the printed September 195o Revisions of Article 9. It
is believed that this mimeographed draft, in substantially its present form, with the same section
numbering, will appear as the final draft of Article 9 to be presented to the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at their May i951 joint meeting.
2 UNIFR Rm LAws ANNorATED i. This Act has been adopted in 12 states and territories.
'This Act was never adopted by any state.
'9 UNsFosR LAws ANNoTATED 672. This Act has been adopted in 28 states, and the steadily increas-
ing number of states of adoption has shown the usefulness of the Act.
'These laws are not sponsored by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
but in substantially similar form they have been adopted in 21 states. See, e.g., Naw YoRK PFRs. PROP.
LAw §45; N. J. REv. STAT. tit. 2, ch. 6o, Art. 20. The statutes are summarized in Silverman, Factoring:
Its Legal Aspects and Economic justification, 13 LAw & CoNrTrEs. PROB. 593, 602"603 (1948).
0 The statutes are classified in Silverman, supra note 5, at 6o5-6o6.
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and with the financial institution collecting the accounts) and of "accounts receivable
financing" (which is essentially the assignment of open accounts as security for a
loan, with the assignor collecting and accounting to the assignee for the proceeds).
If the sale by the merchant deals with durable consumer goods like automobiles or
refrigerators, or with industrial machinery or equipment, the credit extended may
be for terms running for two to five years and payments in installments may be
provided. In such a case the merchant wants to retain security in the goods, and
customarily has done so in the forms known as conditional sale or chattel mortgage.
Thus the sales problem leads to the problems of chattel security. Moreover, the
amounts tied up in these long-term receivables or "chattel paper" may be many times
greater than the merchant's inventory or his entire working capital, and he may have
to raise cash either by selling or pledging the chattel paper. Thus the sales problem
leads naturally into the legal problems connected with the assignment of these long-
term receivables.
If the merchant does not have even sufficient working capital to provide for his
inventory, he may have to obtain credit from his supplier, or credit from another
source with which to pay his supplier. This credit, when it has to run beyond the
conventional 30 or 6o days, is frequently supported by security in the goods involved,
which security has customarily taken the form of a chattel mortgage on the goods,
a trust receipt, more recently a factor's lien, and less frequently a conditional sale of
the goods. Thus, the sales problem reaches backward to these forms of tangible
security in a merchant's stock in trade, or inventory.
Finally, any of the forms of receivables involved may be evidenced by a negotiable
instrument, and in fact conditional sale contracts and chattel mortgages evidencing
the sale of goods to a user are frequently accompanied by a negotiable promissory
note. Thus, the subjects of sales and of the creation and assignment of chattel paper
tie in (or should tie in) with the field of law formerly known as negotiable instru-
ments and known in the Code as Commercial Paper.
I
FALSE STARTS IN CODIFYING COMMERCIAL SECURITY
In attempting the integration and codification of this multifarious subject, or
group of subjects, the draftsmen made several false starts.
i. Organization of the Material. The draftsmen in the beginning were overly
impressed with the economic fact that inventory flows naturally into receivables and
that both inventory and receivables constitute the basic working capital of the mer-
chant. By a series of definitions they, therefore, tried to assimilate receivables into
inventory for legal purposes. The resulting drafts' failed to take into account the
fact that many of the problems of receivables relate to the assignment thereof, and
" Tentative Draft No. -Article VII, April 21, 1948; Tentative Draft No. 2-Article VII, Chapter Il1,
August 6, 1948; mimeographed draft of Article VII, Chapter III, circulated December 9, x948; May 1944)
Draft, Article 7, Part 3.
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that these assignment problems involve three parties: the merchant, the buyer of the
goods, and the assignee of the buyer's obligation. Inventory financing, on the other
hand, involves only a two-party relationship between the merchant and his creditor.
Moreover, there is little homogeneity between the problems of the goods on the
self, the 30-day unsecured receivable, and the long-term secured installment re-
ceivable. The drafts constructed on this basis were wholly unworkable and the
draftsmen were commendably quick so to concede.
In order to get a more accurate view of the variations in the problems involved,
some drafts were then constructed based on the nature of the subject matter, e.g.,
pledge, inventory financing, accounts receivable financing, consumer goods, crops,
and industrial equipment. These drafts were very helpful in focusing attention on
the extent to which these various subject matters had elements in common, and the
points at which the subject matters had to be treated separately." In September,
1949, the draftsmen were able to achieve essentially the present structure, based on
the following principal topics: rights of the parties to the agreement; rights of third
parties, including perfection of security interests; formalities of filing; and rights
on default? With this structure the problem of organization of the material has been
largely overcome, and it has been possible to view the substantive problems without
the hampering effect of the former unsuitable arrangements.
2. Protection of the Debtor. The draftsmen made another false start in conceiving
that they could drastically reshape the relative positions of debtor and creditor, and
considerably weaken the rights of the creditor vis-a-vis the debtor. The same con-
ception shown in the Sales article and its comments,10 that ordinary everyday busi-
ness is filled with examples of the big fellow oppressing the little fellow, dominated
the drafting of remedies in the Secured Transactions provisions. The draftsmen
did not, and in the present writer's opinion could not, make any showing that there
were significant abuses requiring correction in the general field of commercial
secured lending. In the absence of justification, the paternalistic drafts" were wholly
unacceptable to any representatives of creditor interests, and most of these provisions
have been wisely abandoned. While it has been said that the abandonment of these
provisions converted Article 9 into a "creditors' statute," such thinking misconceives
the true situation. Users of credit, as well as the creditors, gain advantage from a
legal structure which makes possible the extension of credit simply and with cer-
tainty as to security. Uncertain legal structures, on the other hand, prejudice debtors
with respect to the availability of prospective creditors, the types of creditors willing
' These drafts were mimeographed for working purposes; were discussed at a conference of the
Reporters, their official advisers, and certain other persons in New York in July, 1948; but were never
circulated generally.
' September 1949 Revisions of Article on Secured Transactions (then designated Article 8). The
structure therein adopted has been basically retained in all later versions.
t" Proposed Final Draft (Spring 1950) §2-2o2, comment 3; §2-2o9 and comments; §2-3o2 and com-
ments; §i-2o5, comment 6.
"
1 Tentative Draft No. 2-Article VII, Chapter III, August 6, 1948, §320 and comments; mimeo-
graphed draft of Article VII, Chapter III, circulated December 9, 1948, §§324, 329, 3 29 A.
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to enter the field, and the rates necessary to compensate the creditors for the risks
involved. At present, the enforcement remedies in Article 9 are, generally speaking,
practical, efficient, and just to both parties. The only vestige of paternalism still
remaining in Article 9 is the provision for disclosure on consumer transactions, dis-
cussed below.
3. Problems of Security and Problems of Credit. There remain a group of false
starts which appear likely to persist as unsatisfactory solutions to certain problems
relating to sales to consumers. The draftsmen have assumed that the purported
evils involved in the extension of installment credit to consumers derive from the fact
that such credit is secured. This is a completely erroneous analysis. The problems
of cost in the extension of credit to consumers arise out of the nature of a sale on
credit as such, and not out of the security. The same problems exist in the case of
sales of goods to consumers on installment credit where there is no security.12 Be-
cause of the faulty analysis, the disclosure provision with reference to consumers'
credit transactions is placed in Article 9, where its applicability is made dependent
on the fact that security is taken, rather than in Article 2 on Sales where it should
be if its applicability were made co-extensive with the problems. Likewise, the
penalty for nondisclosure or inadequate disclosure is made loss of lien,' instead of
a penalty more directly related to the problem, namely, the cost of the privilege of
receiving credit.' Similarly, the treatment of the use of a negotiable note in con-
nection with such sales (with its concomitant potential cutting off of consumer
defenses in the hands of a holder in due course) is placed in Article 9,1" where its
applicability is made dependent upon the existence of security, rather than in Article
2 on Sales or Article 3 on Commercial Paper, where it would have the proper scope
and be applicable to all credit sales in which a negotiable note is taken 6
II
LEADING FEATURES OF THE CODIFICATION
With this background, we can discuss the most important features of Article 9
as presently drafted.
i. Chattel Financing as Commerce. We can heartily approve the recognition of
chattel financing and receivable financing as fields of commercial law, and their
inclusion in a Commercial Code which starts basically with a sale and carries it
through the legal ramifications of the chain of events thus begun. The proposed
removal of these fields of law out of the atmosphere of property law and into the
atmosphere of commercial law is highly desirable, because these types of transactions
are vital to commerce in goods and the receivables are themselves important sub-
jects of commerce 7
"5 This problem is considered at greater length in Kripke, Chattel Paper As a Negotiable Specialty
Under the Uniform Commerdal Code, 59 YALE L. J. X210, 1212-1214 (1950).
13 §9-209. " Kripke, supra note 12, at 1213.
§9-207
.  
"See Kripke, supra note 12, at 1218-1219.
lThe conomic integration of these fields of law with commercial transactions is discussed in Kripke,
The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. RFv. 577, 578-586,
614-61.5 (1949).
Ti MODERNIZATION OF COMMERCIAL SECURITY
2. Omission of Automobile Title Problems. In contrast with this desirable recog-
nition of chattel security as a field of commerce demanding codification was the
decision to omit from the Code a uniform treatment of lien and title problems
relating to automobiles. The automobile is one of the largest single objects of
commerce in goods. As such, it presents special problems of title and security
because of its mobility, its large unit value which requires financing, and its dur-
ability which makes possible long-term financing. For the intercity and interstate
truck, these problems are intensified. Attempts had been made in the past to deal
with the ownership problems of automobiles through the certificate of title device,
and one such attempt was made in a uniform act sponsored by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.'8 This act and many of the
separate state statutes were wholly inadequate to meet the actual commercial prob-
lems of automobile financing and ownership. Recognizing the importance of the
subject for commerce and the inadequacy of the existing state of the law, the spon-
sors of the Code set out to insert in their Secured Transactions article a treatment
of automobile title and lien problems.' 9 Unfortunately, their attention was turned to
this problem too late in the project, and the draft appearing in the first overall com-
pilation of the Code in May, 1949 was stated to be only a single Reporter's draft
which had not yet been considered by the Chief Reporter and staff or other persons
in the hierarchy of the sponsor organizations.20 In the September, 1949 draft of the
Secured Transactions article, this material on motor vehicles was deleted, and the
conclusion was orally announced at the September, 1949 joint meeting of the sponsor
organizations that this subject could not be treated without going too far in the
direction of police regulation. The earlier uniform law on the same subject and
another uniform law on automobile registration may cause one to doubt the necessity
for this conclusion, and certainly it is particularly regrettable that the most im-
portant single subject matter of chattel ownership and chattel security is being left
with its applicable law in a chaotic state. The single object of commerce which most
vitally needed uniform law throughout the country has been excluded from the
attempt to achieve uniformity.
Not only has this problem been denied the uniform national treatment which
it so badly needs, but the Code has not even given adequate extraterritorial effect to
existing certificate of title laws. Section 9-io3, in requiring refiling of security in-
terests when chattels have been moved from one state to another, gives no special
treatment to a security interest shown on the certificate of title under the law of the
state of registration, when the automobile is subsequently brought into another
state.2 '
3. Place of Filing of Chattel Liens. It is also regrettable that the draftsmen's
'Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act, IxI UNIFoR LAws ANNorATr 143.
"8 Article 7, Part 8, of the May 1949 Draft. " May 1949 Draft, page 69x, footnote.
2In a conference with spokesmen for American Bar Association committees, some of the Reporters
indicated recognition of the need for special treatment of certificate of title situations, in the event of
removal of the chattel. The draft which next appeared, however, does not treat the problem separately
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recognition of chattel security problems as commercial problems should be com-
promised by concessions of expediency toward local property law conceptions. The
Code is necessarily a compromise of the views of all parties concerned, including the
general membership of the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. On the problems of filing security in-
terests, the joint meetings of these sponsor organizations have shown an insularity
of approach. Apparently, the security interests are not thought of as incidents in
the nationwide mechanism of the distribution of goods. Instead, they are thought of
as local property law transactions, in which the local legal practitioner should be
able to search a title in the county records. As a result, every draft of the Reporters
providing for state-wide filing of chattel security interests has met with opposition
from the floor of the sponsor organizations. The latest current draft still contem-
plates local filing as well as state-wide filing, for debtors whose places of business
are in a single county, in the case of receivables, inventory, and industrial equip-
ment. The fact that the provision for county filing has been printed in brackets in
the last several drafts22 indicates that the Reporters still hope to win their point on
the floor, and one may join them in this hope. The Reporters, however, have given
up the struggle in the case of consumer and farm goods and have called for local
filing.23 Since this provision applies almost exclusively to automobiles and farm
tractors,24 its inadequacy to meet the facts of modern mobility is evident.
4. The Filing of Consumer Liens. The Reporters have also been faced with tra-
ditionalism in the consideration of a rule as to the filing of security interests in con-
sumer goods. Generally speaking, existing chattel mortgage laws require filing of all
chattel mortgages regardless of the type of commodity or amount involved. Similar-
ly, where filing is required for conditional sale contracts, the filing requirement does
not depend on the nature of the goods or the amount involved; and where filing is
not required, the rule of law applies uniformly.
A strong case could be made that this uniform treatment is obsolete. Under
modern conditions, particularly in urban areas, the filing records are almost never
consulted in connection with liens on consumer goods. The filing, therefore, gives
no actual notice, and it can be argued that the validity of the lien against third parties
should not be made to depend on compliance with a filing requirement. Some of
the Reporters have at various times indicated sympathy with this position, but any
attempt to omit a requirement for filing of consumer goods liens always runs into
opposition on the floor of the sponsor organizations. The current draft of Article
9 omits a filing requirement in the case of purchase money security interests in con-
sumer goods (other than fixtures, motor vehicles, and farm equipment having a
purchase price not in excess of $25oo).52 In other cases, filing is required for
security interests in consumer goods. It may be conjectured that these provisions
represent the Reporters' attempt to compromise between the theory that filing is
" §9-4oi() (a). 3 §9-4o1()(b).
24 See §9-3o2(c) and (d). " §9-3o2(c) and (d).
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meaningless for consumer liens, and the insistence of the general membership of the
sponsor organizations that there be filing in all cases on chattel liens.
Unless one is willing to say that the largest exemption from filing requirements
that is attainable under the political realities of the sponsor organizations is per se
desirable, the present provisions seems to be an illogical solution of the problem.
Once a security interest has been created, a third person does not care whether that
interest was created in a purchase money transaction or in a loan transaction. If he
can search the files to ascertain the existence of a security interest for loan transactions,
he should be satisfied upon completion of his search that he has discovered all
prior security interests which are good against him. In such cases there should be
no unfied interests which he cannot find by searching, but which are valid against
him. On the other hand, if we accept the premise that the records will seldom be
searched, then there is no more reason for requiring the filing in the case of loan
transactions then there is in the case of purchase money transactions. The dis.
tinction in rule is further complicated by the complexity of the "purchase money"
concept, whose definition in the Code is by no means self-evident. 26 A company
in the small loan business might find that its loan was or was not a purchase money
security interest, and, therefore, did or did not require filing for its perfection, en-
tirely without reference to any set of facts of which the lender was cognizant.
Moreover, the effect of the no-filing rule for purchase money security interests in
consumer goods seems to have been an unresolved matter among the members of
the reporting staff until very recently. Section 9-307(2), as it existed in the September
i95o Revisions, provided (so far as is now material) that a security interest is good
against a buyer with notice, including filed notice. The question was raised as to
the relationship of this provision to the absence of a filing requirement for purchase-
money interests in consumer goods. It is not clear that the reporting staff as a group
conceded that such security interests were good against innocent buyers, which is the
normal result when liens or transfers of ownership are valid without filing. At
various times members of the reporting staff have argued that there should be no
way to protect security interests in consumer goods against a good faith buyer of
the goods. If the staff's intention in the September i95o draft was to express the
latter position, then surely the result would have been anomalous. It would have
put the seller's purchase-money interest in consumer goods at a disadvantage against
security interests arising from loans, and would have subjected the seller's interests
to defeat at the hands of innocent purchasers.27 But surely the general membership
2 §9-1o7. The definition includes not only a security interest retained by a seller, but also that
taken by a lender for the purpose of enabling the debtor to require rights in the collateral, if the
money is so used; and even security taken by a person for the purpose of enabling the debtor to acquire
an interest in the collateral if the collateral is in fact acquired within io days, even though the loan
is not used to pay the price.
2 Fortunately, since the i95o amendment to section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act (Pub. L. No. 461,
8rst Cong.) the "bona fide purchaser" test has been abolished as a test of preference in bankruptcy, except
for real estate transfers. See Kupfer, The Recent Amendment to the Preference Section of the Bankruptcy
Act, 22 N. Y. ST. BAR Ass'N BuLL. 329 (1950). Cf. Conwill and Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing:
The Real Effect of Amended 6o(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 HARv. L. REv. 62 (1950).
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of the sponsor organizations in demanding a filing provision intended to provide a
mutual means of protection for the holders of the security interest and for third
persons, and they would not knowingly agree to non-filing in certain areas if the
result would be denial to the holder of the security interest of any opportunity to pro-
tect himself. The confused state of the drafting and of its intended effect existed
because of the draftsmen's concern with the protection of the buyer of second-hand
goods who does not, they believe, search the records before buying from another
consumer. But the number of cases of such sales where the first consumer conceals
from the second the existence of a lien is infinitesimal, and no problem exists
justifying so radical a step as a denial to the holder of a security interest of any
means of perfecting his lien against all third parties m
In the latest version, the ambiguity has been clarified through a rough and ready
solution. The innocent buyer of consumer goods takes free of security interests
that are more than one year old, and subject to security interests not over one year
old. In practical effect, this means that the buyer is protected against a deception in a
small amount but not against a deception in a big amount. The best thing to be
said for the solution is that the practical problem is not large in any event, and this
solution possibly hits upon an approximate dividing line between situations in which
a lay buyer might and situations in which he might not be alert enough to ask about
encumbrances.
5. Inventory Financing. The Code materially improves the legal position of in-
ventory financing. At this mature stage in our economic history, when "inventory"
includes such items as machinery, automobiles, and other "hard goods," it is possible
to think of inventory financing free from the overtones of fraud and concealment
with which such financing became associated when the inventory lien transaction
was typically a chattel mortgage on a small retailer's stock of groceries or clothing,
made with the intent either to defraud creditors or secretly to prefer the mortgagee.
Therefore, Article 9 avoids the artificial limitations which appeared in the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act concerning the nature and purpose of a trust receipts transaction,
which limitations undoubtedly arose as the draftsmen tried to justify to themselves
and to others the creation of a form of security without the handicaps of the law of
chattel mortgages on inventory. The inventory security device under the Code will
not be burdened with "trust receipts" questions as to whether title flows from a prior
owner to the "entruster" or whether it comes from the trustee; whether it is a pur-
chase money transaction or a loan transaction; the purpose of the arrangement; or
the other limitations of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. There need be only one
single legal form for all of the types of inventory financing which have been carried
on through the devices of chattel mortgage, trust receipt, factor's lien, and conditional
sale for resale.
"It may be argued that if the problem is so infinitesimal, professional secured lenders should have
no objection to taking the risk of loss of their security interest in favor of bona fide consumer purchasers.
The answer is that no one can foresee the extent to which advantage can be taken of loopholes in the
law, once those loopholes are created.
a" §9-307(2).
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In the redrafting there has been an attempt at clarification of the "proceeds"
provisions of the Uniform Trust Receipts ActY° There has likewise been a clarifica-
tion designed to prevent a monopolization of "retail" chattel paper by the secured
lender who was providing inventory financing for the inventory out of which the
chattel paper arose3 Finally, there has been a clarification of the question of prece-
dence between the inventory-secured person who first files and the inventory-secured
person who first makes advances on inventory. The clarification is in favor of the
one who first files,32 thereby overruling the one case on the subject.-
6. Notice Filing in Accounts Receivable Financing. In the field of accounts re-
ceivable financing, the Code resolves, in favor of central notice filing, the controversy
which has raged before the state legislatures as to the merits of "validation," "filing,"
and "book marking" statutes34 It is certain that this conclusion will provoke wide-
spread opposition in the important commercial states which have reached a con-
trary determination of policy in the legislatures and by judicial decision, and it may
be doubted whether the other advantageous features of the Code should have been
jeopardized by attempting to enforce uniformity on so controversial a subject.
7. Chattel Paper as a Specialty. Among the most highly advantageous features
of this article of the Code is the recognition of chattel paper as a specialty,35 coupled
with the provision that a security interest or other assignment of chattel paper may
be perfected by delivery thereof,' or by notation on the paper itself that it has been
assigned,37 or may be perfected against anyone but a bona fide purchaser by central
notice fiing3s This recognition will clarify the legal position of a type of receivable
which has become an important object of commerce, and facilitate financial dealings
therein.
8. Chattel Paper with Negotiable Instruments. The draftsmen have seemingly
done no fundamental thinking on the question of the relation between chattel paper
and a negotiable note used with the paper. In the early development of the legal
machinery for credit sales on installment terms, the third party financial institution
was concerned not only with the regular credit hazards involved in the question
whether the purchaser would be able to pay, but also in the hazards involved in the
purchaser's possible refusal to pay because of dissatisfaction with the merchandise,
or fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the seller. Accordingly, as this new
type of installment obligations became an important subject of finance, the necessary
legal development was facilitated by resort to a negotiable instrument. These instru-
ments had been developed several centuries earlier to meet similar problems involved
o§9-3o6; compare Uniform Trust Receipts'Act, §io.
§9-3o8; compare Uniform Trust Receipts Act, §9.1 (a).
"§9-312.
"Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N. E.2d 695 (1944).
"See Kupfer, Progress in the Amendment of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, 13 LAW & CoN-
aEMP. PRtoB. 624 (948); Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 13 LAw &
CoNTEn'. PROB. 643 (948).
"§§9-xo((b). 9 §9-3o4(I)(a).H §9.304(0)(c); 9-308. ss§§9-302; 9-3040x)(b); 9-3o8.
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in the free transfer of business obligations, when the primitive facilities of finance,
commerce, and communication resulted in substantial risks to assignees of such
obligations. The law merchant developed the concept of negotiability to free third
parties from the danger of assertion of defenses to definite obligations set forth in a
specified manner, and this concept was by a quite natural development extended to the
new types of installment instruments which arose in the course of chattel financing.
Although these instruments contained monetary promises which had the definiteness
as to the amount and time of payment which is the essence of a negotiable instru-
ment, they were apparently not negotiable because the instruments ordinarily also
contained covenants about insurance, care of the property, etc. To get the benefit
of negotiability, it became the practice to use a separate negotiable note with, and
duplicating the promise to pay in, the security instrument.
Once the legal rights flowing from a transaction become expressed in a negotiable
instrument and also in a separate lien instrument with a duplicate promise to pay, all
kinds of difficulties can and do arise. Fraudulent double financing, or transfers of the
notes without the security instruments and in ignorance of their existence or nature,
become possible. Uncertainty arises as to whether the rights of a third party assignee
and endorsee are governed by the law of negotiable instruments, or by the law of
assignments of non-negotiable choses in action. The obvious answer to the prob-
lem at this late date is to create rules of law which would make unnecessary the re-
tention of the two-instrument device, and the obvious way to do so is to change those
features of negotiable instruments law which deny negotiability to promises to pay
money if accompanied with covenants concerning preservation of the collateral.
On the occasion of the adoption of so far-reaching a Code, which includes other sub-
stantial modifications of negotiable instruments law, it is particularly unfortunate
that the draftsmen did not grapple with the problem 9
9. Protection of the Consumer against the Holder in Due Course. Doing nothing
to avoid the formal problem of two instruments, the draftsmen have attempted, with-
out complete success, to grapple with the substantive problems involved in the use of
negotiable instruments to express obligations arising in credit sales. The solution
has been to give negotiable instruments their normal effect when they arise out of
sales of commercial and industrial equipment, while denying them their normal
effect if created in a consumer goods transaction.40 In so doing, the draftsmen
have, of course, created inconsistency with their own rules in Article 3 on Commercial
Paper as to the status of negotiable instruments, and inconsistency with their own
treatment of chattel paper not accompanied by negotiable instrument41
The draftsmen's result as to consumer goods seems merely to have left the law
in the state in which it is today: (a) If the holder sues on his negotiable note, he
may cut off the defenses of the consumer; therefore, so long as the consumer is able
to pay, the Code does nothing to give him the protection to which it is assumed he is
"9 This point of view is more fully expressed in Kripke, supra note 12, at 1222-1227.
40 §9-207.
"l See Kripke, supra note 12, at 1214-1222.
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entitled.4 (b) If, however, the consumer is unable to pay and the holder resorts
to the security, the consumer may set up any defenses that are available. However,
it is hard to think of defenses which would entitle the consumer to keep the goods
without paying for them, so it is rarely indeed that the Code accomplishes anything
for the consumer. We may be grateful that the loss of this opportunity for funda-
mental rethinking of the problem is not as serious as it might be, for the reason
that the problem itself is of constantly diminishing importance. As standardization
occurs in consumer goods fields, the cases of really justified consumer complaint
against the seller have become infinitesimal.
io. Overruling of Benedict v. Ratner. Since the very early drafts, the Code has
contained an interesting provision abolishing the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.43 This
rule is applicable to types of security which are rapidly converted into cash by sale
or collection, such as inventory and receivables. The rule states in substance that if
the lender does not exercise suitable "dominion" over the cash resulting from the
liquidation of the inventory or collection of the receivables, his conduct is incon-
sistent with the concept of lien and results in the invalidation of the lien." While in
most courts the rule has been given a reasonable application, some of the dicta in the
federal courts of the Second Circuit have been most alarming44 and have led to ex-
tended discussion among lawyers as to the actual and symbolic steps which the
lender must take to exert dominion.
There was for a considerable period of time no serious objection to the proposed
abolition of the rule of law involved, for it was assumed correctly that the abolition
of the principle of law did not preclude the lender from adopting any steps which he
deemed practically necessary for the preservation of his security position. More
recently, however, lawyers interested in commercial financing have begun to express
concern as to the effect of this proposed change of rule, for two reasons.
(a) First, the abolition of any legal requirement of policing the security makes
it practicable for a lender to attempt to obtain security in inventory or receivables
by inserting a "boiler-plate" clause to that effect in any form of loan instrument,
such as a real estate mortgage, bank loan agreement or unsecured-loan agreement,
and even in such instruments as leases. This opportunity is facilitated by the fact
that the Code recognizes the validity of after-acquired property clauses for both
inventory security and receivables,45 with the result that a provision assigning such
security would be effective even though the creditor did absolutely nothing to obtain
periodic assignments as the particular items of inventory or receivables in existence
'2 Some courts, with shaky legal reasoning, have found a way to protect the consumer by denying
that the note is negotiable or that the holder is a holder in due course. See Kripke, supra note 12, at
1219-1221. The draftsmen have indicated approval of this line of cases, and at one point the proposed
draft codified this approach. Proposed Final Draft (Spring 195o) §9-209, and comment 5 thereto. They
have now abandoned this approach and gone back essentially to a restatement of the common law.
If there really is a situation which requires protection, therefore, the remedy will not be found in the
Code, but is left to whatever continuing judicial erosion may occur in traditional concepts of negotiable
instruments law.
'3 268 U. S. 353 (925). "See Kripke, supra, note 17, at 589-592.
11 §§9.i8(2); 9-203.
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changed in the normal course of business. A debtor who was careless, poorly ad-
vised, or in a weak bargaining position might subsequently find himself with his
inventory or receivables unavailable as security, or disregarded as encumbered by
persons scrutinizing his financial statements, although the debtor had had no
intention of using them as security in the first transaction. Whether under the Code
this difficulty would eventually work itself out as lawyers and borrowers became
aware of the problem, and whether the lenders who had obtained the purported
security would voluntarily release it to make inventory and receivables available to
the debtor for future financing, cannot be foretold in advance of adoption of the
Code and some experience under it.
(b) The second objection by those interested in commercial financing was that
the abolition of the legal sanction for proper administration of collateral would
ultimately lead to a most unfortunate competition for business among lenders,
upon the basis of a competitive debasement of proper collateral -control practices.
Inventory financing and receivables financing are peculiarly susceptible to the risk
of disappearance of the collateral, and accounts receivable financing in many con-
texts is likewise peculiarly susceptible to fraud unless carefully administered. Any
competitive pressure against the safeguards which have been developed for this
business would be most unsound,
In opposition to both of these objections, it may be pointed out that provisions
abolishing or limiting Benedict v. Ratner already appear, although not so drastically
phrased, in the accounts receivable statutes of a few of the states.40 While experi-
ence under these state statutes has not-yet been sufficient to justify a firm conclusion, it
must be said that the dangers above mentioned have not yet significantly appeared in
the experience of the states involved. Nevertheless, there is very real concern on
these subjects on the part of many students of the Code.
ii. Revolving Security and Bankruptcy Preference. A further very well-intended
provision of the Code is the attempt to write a provision which would protect a
creditor against preference where his security increased in the normal course of busi-
ness within four-months of bankruptcy4 7 Many financing arrangements contemplate
what is in effect a continuing loan secured by a constantly changing aggregate of
inventory or receivables. Most such arrangements contemplate that the loan will be
secured by all of the debtor's inventory or all of his receivables, or all of a type or
types of inventory or receivables. The quantity of such collateral will necessarily
change in the ordinary course of business, and an increase will not necessarily be ac-
companied by a simultaneous increase in the amount of the loan. Yet if an in-
crease in collateral occurred within four months of bankruptcy and at a time when
(in the opinion of the court) the creditor knew that the debtor was insolvent, the
increase in collateral might be held to be a preference. The draft attempts to pre-
"'See e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. C. i2A §5 (Cum. Supp. 1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. §12 7 6i(d) (Supp.
1947); MICH. STAT. ANN. §19.846 (Cum. Supp. 1947); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§44-83 (Cum. Supp.
1947); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §2721-8 (Supp. 1947).
' §9-zo8(2).
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clude this result by providing that where value is given under an arrangement con-
taining an after-acquired property clause, the after-acquired property "is not security
for a pre-existing debt or claim" if the debtor acquires such collateral either in the
ordinary course of business or pursuant to a contract of purchase made within a
reasonable time after the making of the security agreement and pursuant thereto.
In so far as this provision attempts to change an uncomfortable fact by asserting the
contrary, the draftsmanship is unfortunate. Assuming that the intent is to state that
the uncomfortable fact shall not have its ordinary legal consequences, it may be
questioned whether any state legislation can affect the definition of preference in
the Bankruptcy Act. At any rate, the point has been a troublesome one and the
effort to solve it is all to the good.
2. Disclosure to the Consumer. As of this writing Article 9 still contains Section
9-209, which is a provision requiring disclosure to the consumer of the computation
of the amount of his obligation. Statutes of similar nature have been passed in
many of the states, but many of the statutes go much further. Some include regula-
tion of finance rates, prepayment privileges, and delinquency penalties. Some of
the statutes provide licenses for time sellers and finance companies, and administrative
machinery for the supervision of the situation. Some of the statutes are limited to
automobile transactions, or contain specific provisions with respect to such trans-
actions and the insurance complications that go with automobile financing. There are
also in many states detailed regulations of the business of making small loans.
The draftsmen have chosen to enter this field by confining themselves only to
disclosure. Thus far, they have not succeeded in drafting a disclosure provision
which is deemed practicable by those with most experience in the field of financing
installment sales. In that field, where the instruments are originated by thousands
of sellers and their salesmen who have no legal training, and where the individual
amounts of transactions are small, simplicity and operating efficiency are absolutely
essential, and those interested in the field are not yet satisfied that the draftsmen
have achieved either.
No explanation has yet been offered in any of the printed comments on the Code
for the draftsmen's conclusion that they should enter this field, instead of leaving it
for separate determination in the several states, where proposals covering the wide
range of possible treatments of the subject are regularly offered at each year's legis-
lative sessions. At one of the joint meetings of the sponsor organizations, one of
the draftsmen stated that they desired to treat the subject to prevent any inference
that they did not feel that consumer protection was necessary. However, no such
inference could possibly be drawn from a code which does not purport elsewhere to
cover comprehensively the problems of legal protection of the consumer. On the
contrary, the draftsmen have run the risk of an inference that their provision is the
only treatment of the subject which the sponsor organizations think necessary.
They have entered a controversial field under the handicap that they could not deal
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adequately with the substantive problems involved and were not free to provide for
administrative regulation if that were deemed necessary.
In the long run the safest thing to do with Section 9-2o9 will be to eliminate it.
This is not to contend that no legislation in the field of consumer credit is necessary.
Such legislation is being offered before all of the legislatures constantly, and the
suggestion is merely that each state be permitted to deal with the problem in its
own way. The Code could not in any event accomplish uniformity, because it is
expressly contemplated that the Code will not replace the varied existing legislation
in the field. 8
CONCLUSION
On the whole, Article 9 of the Code is an improvement over existing law. There
is little in it to which one must affirmatively object.48 Its largest defects are those
of omission: failure to deal adequately with problems which cryingly needed atten-
tion, such as the automobile certificate of title problem. On the other hand, there is
much in it to which one can give hearty affirmative approval, such as the strengthen-
ing of the legal basis for inventory financing, and the clarification of the status of
chattel paper.
""See notes to §§9-204 and 9-209.
'
9 Many people will except from this statement the provision requiring filing of notice of assignment
of accounts receivable. Moreover, as of this writing the draft referred to in note i, supra, contains some
technical difficulties of draftsmanship which must be resolved.
